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Abstract: Over the last 40 years, UK higher education has moved from a publicly funded 
system to a mixed publicly/privately funded system regulated as a tuition loans-based 
consumer market, in which both the student as graduate, and the higher education 
institution, are responsible for a significant proportion of total costs . It is nevertheless 
subject to robust government control. This is partly exercised indirectly through comparative 
assessments of institutional performance by public agencies that define common objectives 
and install a hierarchy based on measured performance, helping to differentiate HEIs within 
the market. Institutions remain partly dependent on government funding in the forms of 
research-related support, teaching subsidies and subsidization of the loan system through 
non-repayment of debt. The 2012 introduction of a £9,000 maximum fee for full-time 
students and £6,750 for part-time students in England, based on income-contingent 
repayment arrangements, was associated with a net increase in funding, growth in full-time 
first degree students, and a sharp fall in part-time and mature age students. Part-time 
students begin repayments four years after the commencement of their course of study. The 
long-term cost of the student loans scheme is uncertain and its sustainability is in question. 
After 15 years of declining funding for students, total systemic funding rose by 50% 
between 2000 and 2015 and per student funding also rose, but this benfitted only the 
research-intensive universities in the Russell group. These universities benefit most from 
funds allocated through the government’s periodic national research assessments.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of 
government, located off the northwestern coast of continental Europe. With a 2014 
population of 64.5 million (World Bank, 2015), it combines England, the dominant nation, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland each have 
executive governments and parliaments, and are also represented in the UK parliament at 
Westminster, the sole government of England. The four UK nations differ in their detailed 
policies on higher education funding, as will be explained. The UK’s GDP of US$2,942 
billion in current prices in 2014 was fifth on the world scale, between Germany and France, 
and 16.9% of the economy of the United States (US). UK per capita income in 2014, 
US$39,167 in purchasing power parity terms, was twenty-second in the world, compared to 
US$54,630 in the US (World Bank, 2015). However, the UK is more influential in higher 
education and the associated research than its raw economic power would suggest. On most 
global rankings, it has the second largest number of world top 50 research universities after 
the US (e.g., ARWU, 2015), and it attracts the world’s second largest number of cross-
border higher education students (OECD, 2015, p. 356). More generally, since the mid-
1980s, associated with neoliberal financial government and the “New Public Management” 
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in public administration, UK models of system and institutional organization have affected 
reform agendas in higher education in many nations (Regini, 2011; Shattock, 2012).   
 The remainder of this Section 1, the introduction, summarizes principal features of 
higher education in the UK. Section 2 reviews its history. Section 3 outlines the present 
financing system, including the tuition loans-based framework adopted in 2012. Section 4 
addresses participation, equity and financing. Section 5 expands on system stratification, 
corporate behaviors at the institutional level, and revenue raising. The concluding Section 6 
reviews the efficiency and sustainability of the financing system.  
 
1.1 Higher education in the UK 
 
The term higher education is used in the UK in two senses: in relation to institutions and 
in relation to levels of study and qualifications. In terms of qualifications, higher education 
programs exist mostly at the degree level, in contrast with the US inclusion of two-year 
programs. Most UK higher education institutions (HEIs) are universities. Since 2014, the 
UK no longer has formally required designated “universities” to conduct research and offer 
doctoral programs (Boliver, 2015, p. 611), but most do so. In the UK 11% of post-school 
students study in Further Education Colleges (FECs), mostly at sub-degree certificate and 
diploma levels, but there is also a small number of degree level students. Some such places 
are provided on a franchising basis for universities, while others are offered by FECs in their 
own right. Relations between FECs and universities, including transfer, are less developed 
than are the links between two-year and four-year provision in the US (Parry, et al. 2012). 
UK higher education is both similar to and different from the US sector. With the 
exception of higher education in Scotland, where no tuition is charged, the sector is 
explicitly modelled by government as a student loans-based market in which HEIs are 
expected to respond to the “customer.” As in the US, in the UK norms of institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom are strongly entrenched. Also as in the US, university 
autonomy is understood in terms of the model of the university as a stand-alone firm, led by 
a strategically-minded president and executive that are mindful of the need for revenue and 
prestige. UK universities answer primarily to their own governing bodies, they form and 
implement business plans and from tiem to time  undertake borrowings from financial 
organisations to raise capital. Like their American cousins, they compete with other HEIs 
for students, money, and good academic staff (faculty). For elite institutions; prestige is the 
primary motivator.  
The differences are also significant. First, UK students enter higher education later than 
in the US, typically at 18 years, many studying for three-year degrees. Second, in the 
absence of state governments and large non-profit and for-profit private sectors, there is less 
diversity of institutional mission and type. Third, with the important exception of the 
separate UK nations, system governance is centralized. Self-governing UK universities, 
once defined as “public” and now legally classified as “private,” are still shaped by 
government policy, regulation and funding, and in continuity with their “public” forebears. 
Government manages system shape, incentives and behaviors via performance-oriented 
comparisons like the Research Excellence Framework (REF). There is a fixed ceiling for 
tuition charges for UK citizens and European Union students, further reducing the scope for 
institution-driven variation. While the executive leaders of HEIs exercise considerable 
corporate freedom, their strategies and actions tend to fall within a comparatively narrow 
range of possibilities. 
The principles of autonomy and freedom in British universities are combined with the 
centralized British state, with its normalizing Treasury-driven polity and uniform systems, to 
an extent that seems paradoxical, though it is typical of UK governance. The universities are 
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not seen as outside the state like their US counterparts, not even Oxford and Cambridge, 
which are closest in form to the American Ivy League. Universities occupy a place in British 
life analogous to the national broadcaster, the BBC—both are public institutions and 
institutions of the middle class, formally independent while relying on a sympathetic 
government. Yet the annual public opinion survey by The Guardian finds that, after the 
National Health Service, the universities are the most trusted institutions in the UK, ahead of 
the police, monarchy, and judiciary (Mann, 2015). Fourth, however, the service tradition and 
public engagement are weaker than in the US with its land-grant ethos, independent trustees, 
and popular sports. Certain civic universities have a long history of region building, and in 
general UK higher education is closer towards US practice in relation to both localized 
engagement (Goddard and Vallance, 2014) and the “impact” of and commercial applications 
of research. Yet the instinct for external social referencing is less developed in the UK. The 
state is the main external agent, a de facto collective “consumer” that positions itself as 
operating on behalf of both students and society—which is ironic, given that, nominally, 
market reform is designed to free buyer-seller transactions from state control. 
 
2. History 
 
UK universities are resilient. Their economic and social weight has grown 
continuously, through the transition from the welfare state of 1945-1980 to the high 
capitalism of the neoliberal era, in which the UK’s comparative international advantage is 
centered on the finance sector, business services, and selected technologies (Allas, 2014). 
Throughout the last half-century, there has been a broad consensus in support of the 
expansion of opportunities through growth in higher education, despite continuous changes 
in government policy, especially the financing arrangements and periodic under-funding.  
However, UK higher education was slower off the mark than the US. The US 
developed diverse mass higher education before World War II and, in 1975, reached 50% 
participation in two- and four-year programs. In the UK in 1950, fewer than 5% of young 
people entered higher education. The Robbins Report (1963) stated as a policy principle that 
all qualified students who aspired to higher education should be able to enter, but growth did 
not fully achieve the Robbins projections (Shattock, 2012; Callender, 2014b). The UK’s 
main period of accelerated growth was between the late 1980s and the late 1990s (Boliver, 
2011, pp. 231-233) and it reached a gross tertiary enrollment ratio (GTER) of 50% only in 
1997 (Figure 1). Most of the growth was in the less prestigious universities and the 
polytechnics, which in 1992 were combined with the university sector in a unitary system.  
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Fig. 1.  Gross tertiary enrollment ratio (%), United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America 
(USA), 1971-2013. Source: UNESCO (2016).  
 
 
The number of students in UK higher education rose further from 1.95 million in 2000-
01 to peak at 2.50 million in 2010-2011, before falling to 2.27 million in 2014-2015 (Figure 
2 below; HESA, 2016). Between 2011 and 2015, the number of 18-20 year-olds in the UK 
declined from just over 2.5 million to less than 2.4 million (HEC, 2014: 28-29).1 This 
explains only half of the decline in enrollments, suggesting further factors. Aggregate 
participation remains below American levels. In 2012, the GTER in the UK was 61.9%, 
compared to 94.3% in the US. However, the UK sustains higher age cohort graduation at 
degree level: 47.8% in 2012, compared to 40.1% in the US (UNESCO, 2016). UK higher 
education is concentrated at degree level, and the completion rate is higher than in the US: 
four out of every five UK university students graduate. 
 
Table 1   
Income of higher education institutions (%), UK, by broad category, 1993-14 to 2013-14 
 
 1993-94 
% 
2003-04 
% 
2008-09 
% 
2013-14 
% 
Tuition fees, education grants and contracts   29.6   24.2   28.7   44.5 
Funding body grants—direct subsidies to HEIs   37.0   38.6   34.8   19.8 
Research grants and contracts   14.4   16.1   16.4   16.5 
Endowments and investment income     2.2     1.4     1.4     1.1 
Other income 
 
  16.8   19.6   18.7   18.1 
TOTAL 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: HESA, 2016 
 
The trend from elite to mass and high participation education (Marginson, 2016) and 
the later fluctuations in total UK enrollments were accompanied by changes in financing 
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mechanisms. In 1975, the high point of public funding per student, UK higher education 
consisted of predominantly publicly funded universities based on formal equivalence, with 
funding distributions on the basis of entitlement. By fits and starts it was changed into a 
mixed public and private funding system, modelled as a tuition-based market ordered not by 
prices, but by the positional hierarchy in higher education, mediated by performance 
competition. There have also been changes in student composition, as will be discussed. 
Prior to World War II, a third of university income was from student tuition and a third 
from government. After the war, tuition diminished and dependence on government grew 
(Shattock, 2012, p. 12). Funding per student rose sharply between the late 1940s and the 
mid-1970s, faltering in the second half of the 1960s. It then fell sharply until the early 
1980s, rose in the next four years, a period of little enrollment growth, and resumed its 
downward trajectory, which accelerated in the 1990s expansion. Between 1975 and 1995, 
per student funding declined by almost 50% in real terms (p. 131). Research funding grew 
via Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) grants—the RAE was the predecessor of the 
REF—and project support. This favored the leading institutions (pp. 131, 185).  
In 1997, the Dearing Report recommended a standard £1,000 per year fee in place of 
the existing free tuition for full-time students. This was implemented in 1998 on a means-
tested basis. In 2004, the UK moved to a £3,000 fee in England, funded using income-
contingent student loans, later followed by Northern Ireland and Wales. Then the 2010 
recommendations of the Browne committee resulted in the introduction of a maximum 
£9,000 for domestic student tuition in England in 2012, with a cap of £6,000 in private 
institutions (HEC, 2014, p. 31). The government also withdrew direct subsidies for teaching, 
except for laboratory-based disciplines and a small number of other disciplines that it was 
seen as in the national interest to maintain. Most universities set their fees at the maximum. 
To do otherwise was to position the institution below the standard level of quality, with 
reputational costs. 
 Table 1 looks at broad funding trends over 20 years, beginning in 1993-1994. What 
stands out is the stability of income shares between the large categories until the 2012 
reforms, despite some fluctuation. However, in the five years after 2008-2009 there was a 
major reduction in the share of funding body grants from 34.8 to 19.1%, primarily grants for 
teaching, while income from tuition fees rose from 28.7 to 44.5%, an outcome of the 
introduction of the £9,000 tuition loan regime in the 2012-2013. Research funding rose until 
2009-10, then dipped and slowly recovered. There was growth in income from non-credit 
courses such as continuing education and professional development, though this made a 
minor contribution to total income, and growth also in income from contract and 
collaborative research (HESA, 2016). This suggests an increase in entrepreneurial activity 
and/or engagement with localities, industry and professions.  
Remarkably, given the emphasis on austerity in UK public financing as a whole, the 
1975-2000 decline in per student funding has now been reversed. Between 2001-2002 and 
2013-2014, total funding for higher education grew by over 50% in real terms. Funding per 
student also increased (Wolf and Jenkins, 2015). There was a spike in funding after the 2012 
reforms; no doubt this smoothed the introduction of the £9,000 tuition regime. However, the 
improved resourcing per student was largely centered on research-intensive universities in 
the Russell Group, enhancing system stratification (see below). 
Government has been less generous with funding for student living costs. In 1990, the 
Education (Student Loans) Act froze means-tested student maintenance grants at the 1989-
1990 levels and introduced loans to supplement the grants (Callender, 2015). In 1992-1993, 
higher education students from families with an annual household income of less than 
£10,000 received an annual maintenance grant of £2,989, tapering off to £179 at an income 
of £20,000. The value of and eligibility for maintenance grants later declined, and grants 
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were abolished altogether for 1999-2000. That decision was partly reversed in 2004-2005 
when grants were reintroduced at £1,040 a year, with a variation in 2006-2007 of up to 
£2,700 for the poorest students. By 2015-2016 the maximum grant was £3,387 for students 
from households with incomes of £25,000 or less, tapering off at £42,620. At the same time 
maintenance loans continued (Dearden et al., 2015, p. 8). Maintenance grants were again 
wholly replaced by a universally loans-based system in 2016. 
 
3. Higher education financing in 2015-2016  
 
In 2014-2015, 159 UK HEIs provided higher education, excluding FECs and the private 
sector, organized in a national system with a common legal framework and financial 
accountability requirements. In 2013-2014, total sector income was £30.7 billion in current 
prices (HESA, 2015; UUK, 2015a, p. 5). The income breakdown is summarized in Table 2.  
Of this income, £13.7 billion (44.5%) was derived from all forms of student fees, 
including £3.9 billion (12.7%) from non-EU international students. Funding body grants 
constituted £6.1 billion (19.8%), including £3.2 billion (10.4%) for teaching and £2.1 billion 
(6.4%) for research assessment-related funds. Funding body grants include specific monies 
in strategic innovation and teaching and learning projects (Conlon and Halterbeck, 2015, p. 
10). Research grants and contracts, including projects, totalled £5.1 billion (16.5%). The 
leading research-intensive universities received much higher proportions of their funds from 
research-related sources. More than half of all expenditure was directly related to staff costs. 
In 2014-2015, there were 403,835 staff employed by higher education provider institutions, 
of whom 49.1% were on academic contracts; 67.0% of the latter were classified as full-time 
(HESA, 2016). 
“Other income” in 2013-2014 included residences and catering operations (5.7%), 
health and hospital services (1.1%), and other income for services (10.5%). Endowment and 
investment funding (1.1%) was low, but 3.2% of income was from philanthropic and non-
government sources for research. Giving to UK universities is tied to research steering. 
There was only £64.5 million for intellectual property rights despite the strength of UK 
research science (HESA, 2016), suggesting that, unlike US universities, UK universities 
mostly leave direct commercialization of research to the external market. They are more 
active in consulting and contract research. 
 
Table 2   
Income of higher education institutions, UK, by category, 2013-2014 
 
 Income 
(£s million) 
Proportion 
of income 
% 
TUITION FEES AND EDUCATION CONTRACTS   
Home and EU students    8,958.0   29.1 
Non-EU students    3,892.0   12.7 
Non-credit courses fees      490.0   1.6 
Further Education         50.3     0.2 
Research training support grants      287.6     0.9 
FUNDING BODY GRANTS   
For teaching    3,187.1   10.4 
For research    1,960.9     6.4 
Other recurrent grants      429.3     1.4 
Capital grants      396.4     1.3 
Further Education      106.2     0.3 
RESEARCH GRANTS AND CONTRACTS   
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Research Councils, Royal Societies, British Academy    1,665.9     5.4 
UK-based charities      994.8     3.2 
UK central and local government, health and hospitals       886.7     2.9 
UK industry, including public corporations      313.0     1.0 
EU sources      789.2     2.6 
Non-EU sources      378.1     1.2 
Other sources        56.4     0.2 
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME   
Endowment and investment income      340.4     1.1 
Residences and catering operations    1,816.1     5.9 
Income from health and hospital authorities      323.0     1.1 
Grants from local authorities        13.8     0.0 
Income for services rendered    1,759.6     5.7 
Income from Intellectual Property rights        64.5     0.2 
All other income 
 
   1,579.1     5.2 
TOTAL INCOME 
 
30,738.4 100.0 
 
Source: HESA (2016). 
 
3.1 Research funding 
 
In common with several European countries, the UK allocates research funding on the 
basis of both general funding and project grants. However, it was the first to allocate its 
general funding on a fully competitive basis in the successive Research Assessment 
Exercises (RAEs) in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2008, and the REF in 2014.  
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Table 3   
The proportion of R&D taking place in higher education institutions, and the role of international 
source income in R&D, UK and selected comparators, 2013 
 
Nation Proportion of all R&D 
that was conducted in 
higher education 
% 
Proportion of all 
R&D funding derived 
from international 
sources 
% 
United Kingdom 26.30 20.65 
Netherlands 31.78 14.27 
Switzerland 28.15 12.07 
Finland 21.52 11.54 
Italy  28.21   9.45 
France 20.75   7.62 
Spain 28.03   7.36 
Denmark 31.77   7.18 
Sweden 27.14   6.80 
Canada 39.80   5.95 
Singapore 29.05   5.91 
Germany 18.00   4.32 
United States 13.83   3.80 
Russia   9.01   3.03 
China   7.23   0.89 
Japan  13.47   0.52 
South Korea   9.24   0.30 
 
Source: UNESCO (2015). 
 
These allocations produce a ratchet effect: funding rises in the year after an assessment 
and then declines (Wolf, 2015b, p. 51). The first RAE was developed to better protect 
science funding, but its lasting significance was that it institutionalized an output-based 
quasi-market, one with enough scope and apparent data credibility to regulate the HEI 
hierarchy (Bailey, 2015). 
The UK is unusual in its level of dependence on foreign research income. In 2013, 
20.7% of the UK’s total R&D funding was sourced from abroad, compared to 4.3% in 
Germany and 3.8% in the US (UNESCO, 2015). In part, this reflects the strength of UK 
university faculty in European schemes. For example, from 2007 to 2013, UK university 
researchers received the most funds of any nation under the EU’s F7 research program: €4.9 
billion, 70% of F7 funding (UUK, 2015a, pp. 34, 39).  
 
3.2 Tuition loans  
 
Under a system of income-contingent tuition loans, students do not pay fees at 
enrollment, nor do they repay debt on a time basis as with mortgage-style loans. Annual 
tuition debt accumulates and students/graduates repay debt only when their income reaches 
a threshold level. Repayments take the form of an increase in the income tax rate. An 
income-contingent loans system can be varied by changing the operating rules that govern 
the stream of repayments. In 2016, the UK repayment threshold was an annual income of 
£21,000, compared to median gross annual earnings for full-time employees of £27,600 for 
the year ending 5 April 2015. The repayment rate was 9% of income above £21,000. The 
rate of interest on the outstanding balance varied from the rate of inflation to an extra 3%, 
depending on income. Any remaining tuition debt was to be retired after 30 years. The 
government paid institutions for that part of tuition costs incurred as tuition debt, operating 
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as a paymaster on students’ behalf. The money went directly to HEIs from the Student 
Loans Company. It did not appear as government spending in the national budget, but 
required increased public borrowings (Wolf, 2015, pp. 47-48). 
In 2015, the scheme was extended to postgraduate education in England, with a 
repayment rate of 6%. Repayment of the two kinds of loans was concurrent. Thus graduates 
of both first- and second-degree programs faced an extra 15% in their tax rates.   
Income-contingent tuition loans transfer tuition costs from the state and current 
taxpayers, and/or from parents and families, to students as future graduates. The fact that 
repayment is delayed and linked to capacity to pay blunts the behavioral effects of fees. 
Income-contingent student loans had been introduced in Australia in 1989. In that country, 
experience had shown that increases in the rate of tuition, or variations in tuition between 
disciplines, had little effect on the propensity to participate or tendency to discriminate 
against low income-family students (Chapman et al., 2014). With income-contingent tuition 
loans, price elasticity is low. As the UK Higher Education Commission has stated: “students 
do not feel or act like consumers” (HEC, 2014, p. 12). “The ‘buy now pay later’ nature of 
the money dilutes the effect of the market mechanism” (p. 44). In , the exceptions are part-
time and mature aged students (p. 27), most of whom are required to repay in the year of 
study, when incomes exceed the threshold. In the UK part-time students are required to 
begin repayment within four years of the commencement of their courses of study, and the 
majority do not qualify for tuition loan support because of previous qualifications.  
The £9,000 tuition regime in England was and is presented ideologically as a student-
centered customer market despite the absence of genuine market pressures (Marginson, 
2013). If this “market” affects HEI and student behavior, it does so through cultural 
persuasion rather than the iron necessity of prices. The ideology of the market also obscures 
the continued dependence of all UK HEIs on public funding. After the 2012 reforms, higher 
education was supported from a mix of private and public funding as before. Private funding 
from the student user increased, and there was public funding from the research councils, 
continuing subsidies in the laboratory disciplines set initially at of £1,500 per student, and 
subsidization of the loans system, principally via non-repayment of part of the loan debt 
which was written off after thirty years and was not passed on to descendants.  
In 2015, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) estimated that full-time students in 
England would graduate with an average debt for tuition and maintenance combined of 
£44,035 (£29,838 in fee debt), compared to £24,754 (£11,807 in fee debt) if the 2012 
changes had not occurred. The IFS also estimated that 73% of graduates would not repay 
their debt in full (HEC, 2014, pp. 11, 36-37). The Higher Education Commission predicted 
that between 2013 and 2044, student tuition debt would expand from £46 to 330 billion (p. 
12). The UK has had no experience of long-term accumulation of student debt on a large 
scale, raising questions about the sustainability of the financing system (see below). 
For 2015-2016, the government deregulated its control of student numbers, so that HEIs 
were free to admit any number of qualified students into places financed by income-
contingent tuition loans (Hillman, 2014). This allowed HEIs to expand their income at the 
rate of £9,000 per student and take advantage of economies of scale. However, it also 
increased the long-term public cost of the funding system, especially as newly participating 
students were likely to repay the cost of tuition at below-average rates.  
 
3.3 Variations between the UK nations 
 
There are important variations between the UK nations in tuition, maintenance grants, 
and loans (Conlon and Halterbeck, 2015, pp. 15-17, 95). Young unmarried undergraduates 
do not pay fees in Scotland. The maximum postgraduate fee is £3,400. In Northern Ireland, 
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the maximum fee for all domestic students is £3,805. Wales has the £9,000 maximum, but 
its students studying anywhere in the UK can apply for grants of up to £5,190.  
 
Table 4   
Income from funding bodies compared to income from student tuition fees, UK nations compared, 
2013-2014 
 
  Income from tuition fees 
and education contracts 
% 
Income from funding 
body grants 
% 
England 46.9 17.7 
Scotland 26.7 34.5 
Wales 47.4 18.1 
Northern Ireland 
 
29.8 37.2 
UK 
 
44.5 19.8 
 
Source: HESA (2016). 
 
Table 4 sets out the respective shares of income from funding councils (direct subsidies 
for institutions) and income from tuition and other fees, including Student Loan Company 
funding (HESA, 2016). Whereas in England and Wales, income from tuition fees exceeds 
funding body subsidies, in Scotland and Northern Ireland the reverse is true. Conlon and 
Halterbeck (2015) calculate the public subsidy as £8,870 for home students in England, 
£9,016 in Scotland, £9,456 in Wales, and £7,721 in Northern Ireland (pp. iii, 33-39).  
 
3.4 Further Education and the private sector 
 
The funding of higher education at £9,000 per student in England contrasts with an 
average of £2,200 per student in all courses in the FECs, underlining the subordination of 
the latter in terms of ascribed social values, and encouraging student movement from further 
to higher education (Conlon and Halterbeck, 2015, pp. 66-67). There were 189,635 higher 
education enrollments in FECs in 2014-2015 (p. 93), compared to 2,266,075 in HEIs 
(HESA, 2016). The half-decade after 2008-2009 saw a substantial increase in FEC students 
at diploma and certificate level, while first degree student numbers fell; in HEIs, first degree 
numbers grew and sub-degree enrollments declined (UUK, 2015a, p. 11). Three-year HEI 
degrees proved most attractive to students (Wolf, 2015, p. 58). 
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Fig. 2.  Change in the number of enrolled students in UK higher education, 2000-2001 to 2014-2015. 
Source: HESA (2016). 
 
In the last decade, government has encouraged private sector development. In 2010, 
there were ten new university designations (Temple et al., 2014, p. 19). The 2012 reforms 
set out to create conditions to facilitate a larger subsidized private higher education sector 
using income-contingent tuition loans. However, private sector fees were capped at £6,000, 
and most private HEIs were ineligible for research funding, positioning the sector at the 
lower end of the hierarchy (HEC, 2014, p. 46). Full statistics on UK private sector HEIs, 
known as “alternative providers,” are unavailable. The number of private HEIs expanded 
after 2012, but they remained small. Though in 2013-2014, 53,000 students enrolled in 
alternative providers were covered by tuition loan arrangements, compared to 7,000 in 2010-
2011, this was less than 4% of all undergraduates (Wolf, 2015, p. 46). In 2015-2016, the 
government included private HEIs in its removal of controls over the number of subsidized 
students, but the licensing of new providers remained a slow process. 
 
4. Participation, access and financing 
 
Figure 2 sets down total enrollments in UK higher education from 2000-2001 to 2014-
2015. As noted above, the fall in numbers after 2011-2012 is only partly explained by 
demographic factors. There was a specific and dramatic decline in part-time and mature 
students (Table 3; UUK, 2015, p. 13). This enhanced a trend already underway, following 
the removal in 2008-2009 of subsidies for students taking qualifications equivalent to or 
lower than the ones they had, but the specific effect of the 2012 changes is unmistakable. It 
is a rare case where changes in financing have been associated with direct and immediate 
effects on student composition. In the ten years after 2004-2005, part-time undergraduate 
students newly entering higher education fell by 28%, and by 55% in England in the four 
years after 2010-2011. Part-timers were 23% of new students in 2014-2015, compared to 
40% in 2010-2011 (Callender, 2014a, pp. 17-18; Callender, 2013). Both undergraduate and 
postgraduate part-time students were deterred by the £6750 fee for part-time study that was 
introduced in 2012-2013, which on a pro rata basis was higher than the full-time tuition fee, 
1948135
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together with the requirement for repayment within four years of commencement. In 2015 
the UK government announced that part-time students would be eligible for maintenance 
loans but with about four in five working full-time and ineligible for assistance for living 
costs, it remained to be seen whether that change would impact the future enrolment.  
In the same ten-year period, demand for full-time undergraduate education was strong 
and rising, especially among 18-year olds. After a dip in England and Northern Ireland in 
2012, the first year of the £9,000 fee (UUK, 2015a, pp. 8-10), numbers were soon restored. 
There was also growth and then plateauing in non-EU international students, with the 
growth driven by financial imperatives (for more discussion see below). 
 
4.1 Social access 
 
Social inequality of access is a persistent issue in the UK. To take one possible 
measure, in 2014 only 15.3% of disadvantaged school pupils eligible for free school meals 
applied to UK universities (Wyness, 2015). Inequality appears relatively entrenched. 
Measures of adult skills suggest greater inequalities than in most OECD nations, linked to 
differences in educational attainment (Green et al., 2015). Intergenerational measures of 
social mobility find that income mobility is lower than in most of Western Europe, but 
higher than in the US (Blanden, 2011, pp. 46, 58). In terms of intergenerational class fixity, 
mobility is lower than in the US (pp. 42-43, 54). Some studies find social mobility has 
declined (p. 63), though this is challenged by Gorard (2008) and Saunders (2012).  
 
 
Table 3   
Enrollments in UK higher education by full-time and part-time status and level of study,  
2010-2011 to 2014-2015 
 
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Change between 
2010-11 & 2014-15  
FULL-TIME      % 
First degree 1,251,045 1,312,165 1,312,335 1,334,245 1,340,595 +   7.2 
Postgraduate taught    235,350    230,435    216,790    222,505    221,725 -   5.9 
Postgraduate research 
 
     74,790      78,975      79,680      81,940      83,720 + 11.9 
PART-TIME      % 
First degree    214,190    229,200    216,145    199,610    183,630 - 14.3 
Postgraduate taught    249,860    228,990    210,520    205,440    203,545 - 18.5 
Postgraduate research 
 
     29,070      30,090      29,445      29,555      29,120 +   0.2 
ALL STUDENTS 2,503,010 2,496,635 2,340,275 2,299,355 2,266,075 -   9.5 
       
 
Source: HESA (2016).  
Note: For the sake of simplification, under full-time and part-time students some categories are not included, such as 
enrollments in foundation degrees and sub-degree diplomas and certificates. There were dramatic declines in enrollments in 
these categories over the time period.  
 
Policy focuses mostly on extending the boundaries of inclusion, including the access of  
students from low socioeconomic status backgrounds and under-represented ethnic groups 
(BIS, 2015). However, academic research has focuses on not just inclusion but the 
stratification of higher educational opportunity, including social inequalities in access to the 
leading universities, especially Oxford and Cambridge. Higher education’s function as a 
channel into the middle class is more difficult to sustain, and much more difficult to 
universalize when the growth of higher education outpaces the growth of opportunities for 
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upward social mobility. Inevitably, as systems grow that function becomes more specifically 
centered on higher prestige universities, while the competition to enter such universities 
becomes increasingly intense. This is what has happened in the UK.  
Longitudinal students suggest that while the expansion of total participation has been 
accompanied by an absolute increase in the number of students from under-represented 
social groups, at best there has been a marginal overall improvement in the access of 
students in these categories relative to students from other social groups. Specifically, there 
has been little overall change in the balance of enrollments between students from different 
family income quintiles or occupational status groups (Boliver, 2011). At the same time, 
access to elite HEIs may have become more unequal in social terms, especially for students 
from Afro-Carribean or South Asian background and for students who attended state schools 
rather than independent private schools (Boliver, 2013). A key question here concerns the 
social effects of the changes in tuition and maintenance grants in England and Wales and, 
more generally, the scope of changes in financing to affect participation. Recent research 
suggests financial factors play a lesser role in reproducing social inequalities in higher 
education than once was the case, probably due to the normalization of participation in the 
massified system (Marginson, 2016). In addition, as noted, income-contingent tuition loans 
appear neutral in socio-economic terms—although there is still insufficient research on the 
social effects of changes in tuition fees, including the £9000 tuition regime, and also 
changes to maintenance payments in the UK, especially the latter (Dearden et al., 2011),. 
Sullivan et al. (2015, p. 743) find that “cultural” factors rather than direct financial 
costs exercize the greater influence over participation. They note the nfluence of social 
origins, especially parental education, and private school attendance, in access to elite 
degrees (p. 757). Britton and colleagues (2016) demonstrate that once graduating, students 
from socially advantaged families experience higher earnings than others, which may help 
to sustain social inequalities in participation in higher education. Other studies also 
emphasize unequalizing effects in school and home background (e.g., Jerrim et al., 2015). 
Jerrim (2015) and Jerrim and Vignoles (2015) find boosting school achievement could have 
a greater effect in improving social equality in access than would reductions in tuition fees.  
 
4.2 Measures and models designed to assist under-represented social groups  
 
In the UK, higher education admissions are determined by performance on secondary 
leaving examinations. However, individual institutions have autonomy in admissions 
decision-making and are free to consider supplementary information. For example, 
admissions determinations made on the basis of academic achievement can be nuanced to 
take into consideration class and school type. In the UK’s Code of Practice for the assurance 
of academic quality and standards in higher education, Section 10 recognizes this, indicating 
that “applicants to a higher education system that caters for mass participation will come 
from a wide range of backgrounds, and will demonstrate their potential to succeed in a 
variety of ways” (Quality Assurance Agency, 2006). Freeman (2015, p. 61) notes that 
“Government has increasingly encouraged universities to focus on ‘potential’ rather than 
prior academic achievement particularly in light of emerging research indicating that 
students from lower-performing schools perform better than peers with equivalent 
qualifications once they commence higher education” (e.g. Ogg, Zimdars and Heath, 2009). 
The Higher Education Funding Council for English (HEFCE) requires all HEIs to show that 
their admissions policies support”‘transparency, consistency and fairness” and implement 
strategies to broaden participation (HEFCE, 2009; Freeman, 2015, p. 61). The UK 
government publishes annual data regarding individual institution’s widening participation 
indicators through the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) . Most UK universities, 
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including high demand universities, sustain programs designed to enhance the participation 
of students from low income families and under-represented ethnic minorities. These 
programs extend from admissions policy, to foundation and remedial studies, to students’ 
academic progress in the mainstream, and targeted pedagogy and assessment (Cramp, 2012). 
A broad range of case studies of university-level programs is provided in David (2010), 
Hinton-Smith (2012), Burke (2012) and Basit and Tomlinson (2012).  
 In contrast with higher education in the US, in the UK there appears to be limited scope 
for varied institutional financing models linked to social inclusion. First degree tution costs 
are fixed on a system-wide basis. Universities can vary the £9000 downwards for all 
students but this is seen as a signal of weaker quality. In relation to particular categories of 
student, perhaps the UK institutions have something to learn from American experience. 
Nevertheless, with income contingent loans the cost of tuition per se is not a principal 
impediment to access and small variations have negligible effects on demand. More can be 
achieved by varying the academic criteria for entry. This again carries reputational risks in a 
competitive environment, and works best in very high demand HEIs where all entrants have 
high scores, including those subject to positive discrimination.  
There are few sources for financing either student scholarships or tuition subsidies. The 
role of philanthropy in student financial support is minor in comparison to the US, and 
confined to a few leading HEIs, including Oxford and Cambridge. For example, this enables 
the University of Cambridge (2016) to subsidize the tuition costs of needy students with 
part-cost scholaships. The number of needy students so supported is much smaller than in 
the University of California system, where, on the basis of family income, 40 per cent of 
undergraduate students pay no tuition at all (Dirks, 2015). This is because Cambridge admits 
a much smaller number of students from poor families than do UC Berkeley and UCLA. 
Again it is admissions, not financial support, that primarily limits the social composition.  
 
Business models, drivers and revenues in a stratified quasi-market 
 
The framing of UK higher education as a market of competing corporations, 
culminating in the 2012 tuition reform, is associated with three systemic tendencies. First is 
the development of comparative assessments of institutional performance by public agencies 
that define common objectives and install a hierarchy based on measured performance, 
which differentiates HEIs within the market. Second is the strengthening of the individual 
HEI as a locus of strategic planning and decision-making (Shattock, 2012). Third is the 
continuous growth of income-generating activities, a tendency pursued harder in some HEIs 
than others.  
 Stratification both rests on income inequalities and produces them. Davies and Zarifa 
(2014) show that enhanced competition and entrepreneurial activity are associated with 
greater stratification of HEI incomes, as shown by rising higher Gini coefficients in 
Canadian and US higher education. It is likely this has occurred in the UK also. But 
competition plays out in a system that was already hierarchical in its pre-market phase. The 
UK sector was distinguished from Germany, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries by 
its pronounced hierarchy based on reputation, resources and research (albeit less pronounced 
than in the US). Market competition reinforces the pre-given hierarchy rather than 
subverting it. Mediation by performance comparisons largely confirms the institutional 
hierarchy.  
 
5.1 The university as quasi-firm 
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The corporatization of individual HEIs has increased the scope for executive decision-
making and planning in financial matters. UK universities carry an increasing number of 
functions and raise a growing proportion of their own funds. For example, they now bear the 
cost of capital works, with enhanced scope for borrowing to replace government capital 
funding. In 2014, the sector planned to invest more than £15.2 billion in infrastructure over 
the next four years (HEC, 2014, pp. 11, 49).  
Risk has been enhanced. For example, rising interest costs and the spread of bond 
financing to “less financially secure parts of the sector” increase potential default (pp. 50-
51). Risk management is used universally through UK higher education (NJNCHES, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the logic of competition, there is also growing sharing of assets, such as 
large-scale research equipment (UUK, 2015b, pp. 58-63), which both reduces unit costs and 
spreads and reduces risk. But risk is also differential, being greatest in low status HEIs. 
 
5.2 Stratification in the UK 
 
Boliver (2015) uses cluster analysis to identify distinctive groupings of institutions, 
based on research quantity and quality, student satisfaction with teaching, endowment and 
investment income, spending on academic services per student, student-staff ratios, 
academic and also social selectivity of the student intake, and degree outcomes, using four 
different measures. The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge occupy the top tier, the bulk 
of the older universities are in a second tier, and the remaining HEIs occupy one or two 
lower tiers. HEIs do not stratify on the basis of student satisfaction with teaching, but are 
instead distinguished by other measures. Oxford and Cambridge hold exceptional 
endowments and offer student-staff ratios of 11 to 1, half that of many former polytechnics 
(Boliver, 2015, p. 613). A total of 34.9% of their students are drawn from independent 
private schools, compared to 16.1% in the second tier of universities (623).  
Table 5 lists the 2010-2013 research performance of the leading 15 UK universities and 
their incomes for 2013-2014 (Leiden University, 2016; HESA, 2016). These data underline 
the association between income, standing, and the volume of high quality research. 
 
Table 5   
Combined research outputs in 2010-2013, and institutional income for 2013-2014, leading 15 UK 
universities as measured by the quantity of high citation papers in 2010-2013 
 
UK university Number of 
students 2014-
2015 
Total 
research 
papers  
2010-2013 
(inclusive) 
Proportion of all 
papers in top 
10% of field by 
citation rate 
% 
Number of 
papers in top 
10% of field 
by citation 
rate 
Income  
2013-14 
 
 
£s million 
U Oxford 26,005 12,935 17.8 2301 1174.4 
U Cambridge 19,515 12,170 17.3 2100 1504.5 
U College London 35,615 12,249 16.0 1959 1024.6 
Imperial College London 16,610 10,355 15.9 1646   864.6 
U Manchester 38,590    8616 12.3 1062   886.4 
King’s College London 28,730    6358 15.8 1006   603.7 
U Edinburgh 28,880    6810 14.2   968   780.6 
U Bristol 21,555    5615 15.3   861   485.5 
U Nottingham 31,910    5895 12.4   729   571.9 
U Southampton 23,795    5269 12.8   673   484.3 
U Leeds 31,030    5013 12.8   644   587.5 
U Birmingham 34,160    5072 12.1   613   528.2 
U Sheffield 27,195    5023 12.2   611   521.3 
U Glasgow 26,815    4493 13.4   600   511.3 
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U Newcastle 
 
23,110    3941 13.2   520   449.8 
 
Source: University of Leiden, 2015; HESA, 2016.  
 
As noted, income stratification is enhanced by national research assessment. 
Entrepreneurial and service income also flows disproportionately to universities with strong 
reputations (“brands”). The same universities have differential fee charging and earning 
powers in domestic postgraduate education and international education. Teaching-related 
income tends to be higher in HEIs with concentrations of STEM students, who receive 
additional government funding. Wolf and Jenkins (2015) note that between 2011-2002 and 
2013-2014, the real income of universities in the elite Russell Group rose from about £7.4 to 
£12.2 billion, with little change in the income of universities in other groups. While real 
income for teaching rose in all university groupings after the 2012 reforms, the increase was 
sharper in the Russell Group than for HEIs in the other groupings.  
 
5.3 International education 
 
The number of international students entering the UK grew rapidly between 2001-2002 
and 2011-2012, and the UK share of the global market reached 13% in 2012 (OECD, 2015). 
International students concentrate in undergraduate and short-taught Masters, and in 
business studies, information technology and engineering. In the last 15 years, non-EU 
students have generated most of the system growth at the postgraduate level (HEC, 2014, p. 
25). In 2014-2015, 14% of all enrollment in UK higher education was from outside the EU, 
and 5 % from EU countries other than the UK nations (HESA, 2016). EU students pay 
tuition fees on the same basis as UK students. They are eligible for tuition loans while 
ineligible for maintenance loans. In contrast, non-EU students are a primary source of 
discretionary revenues. Because international fees can be freely varied upwards, they tend to 
be highest in prestigious universities. UK universities have a strong incentive to expand non-
EU international enrollments and have developed a high financial dependence. As Table 1 
shows, in 2013-2014, non-EU students generated 12.7% of all institutional income. 
Undergraduate fees for non-EU students typically ranged from £10,000 to £15,000 per 
annum in non laboratory-based disciplines, but annual undergraduate costs at the University 
of Oxford were £21,140 in the classroom, while University College London charged 
£34,800 in its clinical programs (Matthews, 2014).  
 The overall economic contribution of international students, including living costs and 
travel, and of transnational education overseas, was an estimated £17.5 billion in 2011 (BIS 
and DE, 2013, pp. 59-60). The Minister for Higher Education wants £30 billion by 2020 
(Ratcliffe, 2015). However, this policy goal is in tension with countervailing policy pressure 
to reduce net annual migration, which includes students on temporary visas. Since 2012, 
numbers have plateaued. Continuing increases in students from China, Hong Kong SAR, 
and Malaysia have been offset by declines from South Asia and Saudi Arabia (HESA, 
2016). The downward pressure on numbers creates difficulties for lesser status HEIs, which, 
in contrast with prestigious HEIs, tend to adopt volume maximization strategies in 
international education because they have less access to other sources of additional 
revenues.  
 
5.4 Performance management and funding 
 
Within the quasi-market national system, UK HEIs are regulated and disciplined by 
annual performance reviews in comparative form, in which HEIs are abstracted from their 
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individual historical and resource conditions and treated as equivalent players on a mythical 
level playing field. This both enforces conformity to the behaviors that tend to maximize 
performance, achieving government goals, and differentiates degree value while 
legitimating unequal resources, thereby advancing the leading HEIs and their users. While 
performance competitions are mostly framed by the government or government agencies, 
they include university rankings published by The Times, the Times Higher Education, the 
Guardian, and the business services firm QS. Certain university rankings powerfully 
influence decisions by students and mobile researchers (Hazelkorn, 2011).  
The most important performance comparison in UK higher education is national 
research assessment, because of the role of research in determining prestige and monies, and 
because of the intensity and comprehensive scale of the process. In the 2013-2014 REF, £47 
million was spent in universities and £12 million in government administrative costs (Sayer, 
2014). The research assessment drive focuses on lifting research quality and on the early 
“impact” of research. It also encourages universities to recruit high performers by 
“poaching” from each other. Successful researchers offer themselves to more prestigious 
institutions. Both tendencies exacerbate resource concentration and stratification effects. 
The ratings for “impact,” a criterion first introduced in 2013-2014, tended to be dominated 
by the traditional research leaders, which, as usual, led also on output quality (Jump, 2014).  
 Other system-wide performance comparisons cover graduate employment rates and 
salaries and student satisfaction. The survey for the Higher Education Statistics Agency’s 
Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education Institutions is conducted six months after 
graduation (Jobbins, 2015). Though it is unclear to what extent graduate “destinations” are 
generated by higher education as distinct from family background, government, media and 
HEIs are preoccupied with “employability.” The concern is least in research-intensive 
universities (Temple et al., 2014, p. 18).  The National Student Survey of satisfaction is 
conducted towards the end of students’ programs. Both comparisons function as proxy 
measures for the quality of teaching. There are no direct measures of student learning 
achievement, though the possibility has been foreshadowed (BIS, 2015a; Johnson, 2015). 
The government has suggested that HEIs with superior ratings for student satisfaction and 
“employability” could vary the domestic fee level upwards. As with the REF, the 
government is again positioning itself as a collective consumer on behalf of users, with 
financial rewards attached. In the absence of real price signals, simulation is essential to the 
quasi-market.  
 
6. Summation and conclusion  
 
How well does UK higher education meet the financial needs of its stakeholders: 
students, employers, faculty, and policy makers and regulators in government? Full-time 
students are attending in growing numbers, while income-contingent tuition loans protect 
them from immediate financial cost. Part-time students are diminishing, apparently for 
financial reasons. The longer-term effects of loans on graduate financial behavior are 
unknown. In June 2015, the unemployment rate for young graduates was 4.4%, the lowest 
since the pre-2008 recession level of 2.7% (BIS, 2015b). While all faculty would like to be 
paid more, the degree to which UK faculty are satisfied with their level of pay relative to 
other professionals is unknown. However, the stakeholder that really matters is government. 
In this centrally managed system, it operates as the proxy for all others. While government 
has no satisfactory measures of graduate quality and HEI productivity, it can address 
questions of system efficiency and system sustainability.  
 
6.1 System efficiency 
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The long period from 1975 to 2000 in which public funding was constrained, 
competitive pressures increased, and resources per student dropped sharply institutionalized 
a continuous pressure to reduce costs. The centrality of cost management led to the spread 
throughout the sector of a Chief Finance Officer (CFO)-led organizational model, matching 
the Treasury model in government. UK universities built an international reputation for 
financial management. The only ready source of private income at scale was fee revenues 
from international students. This helped universities to survive austerity and was the chief 
factor in installing a more market-driven culture (Shattock, 2012, pp. 160, 245). When 
resources increased again through tuition fees, the capacity for allocative efficiency 
persisted. The 2015 Higher Education Commission found that from 2005 to 2011, the sector 
achieved £1.38 billion in efficiency savings (HEC, 2014, p. 48). While the exact figure was 
partly based on self-reporting, the tendency is clear. However, in comparative terms, system 
efficiency appears to be greater in research than in education.  
In research, the UK accounts for 3.2% of global R&D expenditure, 9.5% of scientific 
papers downloaded, 11.6% of citations, and 15.9% of the most highly-cited articles (HEC, 
2014, p. 22). This exceptional performance is modestly funded (Allas, 2014, p. 5). In 2014, 
UK spending on R & D as a proportion of GDP was 1.70%, compared to an Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country average of 2.37%. The UK’s 
GDP share was well below those of China (2.05%), France (2.56%), the USA (2.74%), 
Germany (2.84%), Japan (3.58%) and South Korea (4.49%), but ahead of Canada (1.69%) 
(OECD, 2016).  
In spending on tertiary education institutions, the UK allocates more, but achieves less. 
The OECD’s Education at a Glance finds that, in 2013, the UK allocated 1.8% of GDP in 
funding of tertiary education, well above the OECD average of 1.5 % and ahead of Germany 
(1.2%), France (1.4%), and Japan (1.5%), though below Korea (2.3%), Canada (2.5%), and 
the US (2.8%) (OECD, 2015: 235). Yet the participation rate was only slightly above the 
OECD average. In 2013, 58 % of young people entered degree level programs, compared to 
an OECD average of 57 %, and the UK’s participation rate dropped to 48 %, compared to an 
OECD average of 55 %, when international students were excluded. On the other hand, in 
2013, 38 % of young people were expected to graduate from degree level programs 
compared to an OECD average of 34 % (OECD, 2015: 348, 72).  
One possible explanation for the modest performance in aggregate participation relative 
to resources and the stronger completion rate is that a high proportion of spending, including 
research assessment funding, is centered on the top HEIs. This helps to sustain their research 
performance and means that students entering those universities might benefit from their 
affluence, though how much trickles down from research funding to teaching resources is an 
open question. Another factor may be the costs of quasi-market competition. A study of the 
effects of the 2012 reforms on institutional behavior found that a lesser status HEI was 
“devoting more management time and spending more money in efforts simply to maintain 
their market share” (Temple et al., 2014: 13).  
In the 2015 system ranking by Universitas 21, the UK was ranked in 24th place out of 50 
countries for “resources,” but in second place for “output.” The differential of 24 places was 
said to be “indicative of an efficient higher education sector.” The UK ranked third for total 
publications, third for the average academic impact of articles, and second after the United 
States for the quality of its best universities. In the overall ranking, the UK was eight of 50 
countries, but when all country scores were discounted on the basis of GDP per capita, the 
UK moved to second place, again indicating relative system efficiency (Williams et al., 
2015). However, the Universitas 21 ranking used the 2012 expenditure data from the OECD, 
in which the UK’s total expenditure of 1.2% was below the OECD average of 1.6% for total 
 19 
expenditure (OECD, 2014, p. 232). In 2015, the OECD calculation of the UK’s spending 
was revised upwards, taking into account the post-2012 funding level.  
The extent to which the improved funding per student of recent years has been taken to 
reflect better conditions for teaching and learning is unclear. The overall student-staff ratio 
fell only slightly: from 16.6 in 2004-2005 to 16.0 in 2013-2014 (HESA, 2016). The 
incidence of small group face-to-face teaching may have fallen, not increased, except at 
Oxford and Cambridge (Wolf and Jenkins, 2015). In some but not all HEIs, the growth of 
entrepreneurial and business functions in marketing, quality assurance, investments, alumni 
donations and facilities management has expanded professional staff in relative terms. In 
addition, “universities have focused on increasing the numbers of associate teaching-only 
staff, as well as short-term research-only staff, rather than expanding their core lecturing 
staff” (Wolf and Jenkins, 2015). This may have had negative implications for teaching 
quality. 
 
6.2 Longer-term sustainability 
 
According to the 2015 Higher Education Commission, the 2012 reform led to a 50/50 
public/private split of higher education costs. The public contribution was 12% in direct 
subsidies and 38% in subsidization of tuition loans via the sub-commercial interest rate on 
tuition debt and non-payments (HEC, 2014, p. 21). This estimate rested on assumptions 
about future UK economic performance, graduate employment rates and earnings, 
government borrowing costs, and the future parameters of the scheme. In 2015, the loans 
subsidy, the Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) Charge, was calculated as 45%, 
meaning that of every £1 lent by the government, 0.45p. would not be repaid (McGettigan, 
2015a). Later in 2015, the government reduced the accounting discount rate applied to 
student loans from 2.0 to 0.7%, reducing the RAB charge from 45 to 30% (McGettigan, 
2015b) and improving the apparent sustainability of tuition loans. In fiscal terms, 
sustainability depends on whether the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) has resources to cover the RAB charge. In effect, this places BIS in a situation of 
continuing debt to the UK Treasury, which also manages the terms of that debt. This 
enhances the capacity of Treasury to dictate higher education policy and funding.  
The UK government has a range of options for reducing costs. In 2015, it did not 
increase the £9,000 fee ceiling for full-time undergraduates, allowing inflation to reduce net 
costs. It also froze the repayment threshold at £21,000 until 2021, quickening the payback of 
future loans and reducing long-term unpaid debt. The government noted “fixing loan terms 
and conditions would give more certainty to borrowers, but would reduce the government’s 
flexibility to manage the loan book in the future” (McGettigan, 2015c). Within the settings 
of the income-contingent loans system, there are further options. The government can lift 
the interest rate applied to accumulating tuition debt, increase the rate of repayment applied 
to the income tax schedules, and no longer retire debt after 30 years. The growth of 
resources per student in higher education since the 2012 reforms is unlikely to last. 
 
 
Note
1 The number of 18-20 year olds is projected to continue falling until 2021 when it bottoms 
out at about 2.15 million, 14% below the 2011 level (HEC, 2014, p. 28). 
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